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RE-FINANCING CIVIL LITIGATION
Stephen C. Yeazell*
INTRODUCTION
We find ourselves in the second stage of a revolution in the financ-
ing of civil litigation. The tobacco settlements, on which this sympo-
sium focuses, were the effect, not the cause of the revolution, which
had been underway for decades. As interesting as the tobacco cases
are, we risk misunderstanding the dynamics of civil litigation if we fo-
cus too closely on them, for the tobacco cases are in some respects
anomalous. We shall understand better if our gaze covers a broader
landscape, in which ordinary tort litigation plays a more prominent
role and bet-the-industry cases like asbestos, tobacco, and guns a
smaller one. Seen in this broader perspective, the changes run deep
and affect defendants as well as plaintiffs. Compared with the situa-
tion seventy-five years ago, the plaintiffs' bar is today better financed,
both absolutely and relative to the defense bar. Using the same refer-
ence point, the defense bar, in ordinary cases, is more constrained
than it was when Model Ts came only in black. As a consequence,
plaintiffs' and defendants' lawyers are more evenly matched than they
were in the first quarter of the twentieth century. Those changes in
capitalization affect the outcome of cases, without regard to changes
in procedural or substantive rules. Procedural and substantive
changes have in some cases magnified the changes brought about by
changes in case financing, and in other situations necessitated the
deeper capitalization. Important in itself, understanding these
changes in capital structure also sheds light on some recent legislative
reactions and allows us to assess the durability of the changes. Fi-
nally, this understanding may give us a different perspective on a
question that has occasioned much debate: is the increased rate of
civil litigation in recent decades a result of increased demand or in-
creased supply?
* David G. Price & Dallas P. Price Professor of Law, UCLA School of Law. © 2001, Stephen
C. Yeazell.
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II. SEVENTY-FIVE YEARS AGO
As a starting point, move back seventy-five years. As with any peri-
odization, this one is somewhat arbitrary, but not entirely. Emerging
from World War I, the U.S. economy was recognizably modern, with
mass production establishing itself as the basis of what was to become
enormous industrial strength. The banking system had assumed a
modern shape with the establishment of the Federal Reserve System,1
though deposit insurance was still in the future, and the broader finan-
cial markets were an accident waiting to happen. The legal profession
likewise had a modern shape: most lawyers were being trained in law
schools, with the elite tier of the profession constantly complaining
about the inadequacy of the standards in the tier of schools that
trained the lower tier, as well as about the growing number of lawyers
concentrated in the claimants' bar.2 Let me take from this period a
quite ordinary lawsuit.
A few blocks south of the UCLA campus lays the intersection of
Wilshire and Veteran Boulevards, now claimed as the busiest traffic
intersection in the United States. 3 That claim was not available sev-
enty-five years ago, but traffic was adequate to generate auto acci-
dents. Assume such an accident, a left-turn collision, yielded
substantial injuries. Let us start with the person who might become
the plaintiff. That person could by 1925 find a lawyer who would han-
dle the case on a contingency basis; this form of feeing had become, if
not well liked, at least accepted in the United States after the First
World War.4
That plaintiff would almost certainly have sought a lawyer engaged
in solo practice; indeed, it might have been difficult for her to find a
lawyer not engaged in solo practice, since that was the predominant
form of practice for most lawyers until the last few decades. 5 More
significantly, that lawyer would likely have been operating a practice
1. President Woodrow Wilson signed the Federal Reserve Act establishing the Federal Re-
serve System on December 23, 1913.
2. RICHARD L. ABEL, AMERICAN LAWYERS 52-55 (1989).
3. Jeannine Stein, The Virtues of L.A. 's Prime Protest Spot, L.A. TIMES, July 25, 1996, at El.
4. "Acceptance [of contingent fees] was fairly general by the end of the nineteenth century."
CHARLES WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETHICS 527, n.10 (1986). The ABA approved such fees in
their 1908 Canon of Ethics, although "careful Victorian lawyers gave it the same reception as
they gave ballroom dancing: that the masses engaged in it and the police did not intervene meant
only that it was lawful." Id. at 527. See also, JEROME E. CARLIN, LAWYERS ON THEIR OWN 22
(2d ed. 1994) (stating "The contingent fee probably first came into prominence with the rise of
personal injury practice .... ).
5. In 1954, reporting an analysis done several years earlier, Blaustein & Porter found that just
over two-thirds of American lawyers were solos, neither working with nor employing any other
lawyer. ALBERT BLAUSTEIN & CHARLES PORTER, THE AMERICAN LAWYER 8 (1954).
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that was thinly capitalized, with only very modest resources to invest
in the case.6 The complaint drafted by our thinly capitalized lawyer
would have asserted negligence on behalf of the other driver, the sole
defendant in the suit. Damages would have been available for lost
wages, medical care, and pain and suffering.
Plaintiff's counsel would have filed that claim only if the defendant
had significant independent means or if he had liability insurance for
his auto (his "machine" as my grandmother would have had it), insur-
ance that one could by no means have taken for granted. 7 If we sup-
pose the defendant was insured, he would tender defense of the action
to his insurance carrier, who would refer it to a lawyer on retainer in
Los Angeles. That lawyer would be likely to have an understanding
about hourly rates with the insurer but otherwise operate relatively
free of constraints in regard to litigation strategy. The insurer would
control settlement decisions, but if the case did not settle, as many did
not, it would go to trial.8
The reference to the insurer's settlement authority emphasizes that,
as at all periods during the last two hundred years, the most likely
resolution of the case would be a settlement. In 1925, that settlement
would be quite straightforward: a release of all claims signed in return
for a check drawn on the insurer (or the defendant if the plaintiff had
had the good fortune to be injured by a solvent, uninsured defendant).
Though common, settlements were not inevitable. This is a period in
which rudimentary data suggest that about one in five filed cases en-
ded in trial-a minority but a very substantial minority. 9 Civil prac-
tice was still in significant measure a trial practice. If the case did go
to trial, there might be expert testimony on the extent and likely dura-
6. Even in the generally optimistic view of Blaustein and Porter, writing in the early 1950s and
seeing through rose-tinted glasses supplied by the American Bar Association, the picture did not
look good. In a world in which "annual expenditures of $5,000" on law libraries were "not
uncommon" and the gross average income of lawyers was $14,000, one finds it hard to imagine a
richly resourced solo practitioner. Id. at 15, 21 (finding the income differentials between solo
and firm lawyers striking). Even more remarkable, the median net income of a solo practitioner
in 1951 was below the net income of all lawyers in 1929-in nominal, unadjusted dollars. Id. at
15. Writing a decade later, Jerome Carlin still found his solo practitioners barely making it
financially. JEROME E. CARLIN, LAWYERS ON THEIR OWN 184-200 (1962).
7. The compulsory insurance movement dates from this era and was called forth by the cir-
cumstance that in an increasing number of accidents, a prospective defendant was uninsured and
unable to respond in damages. ROBERT H. JERRY, UNDERSTANDING INSURANCE LAW 842-46
(2d ed. 1996).
8. I have not located good state-court trial rate data for this period. A decade later, the fed-
eral courts were trying about 20% of the civil cases filed. Stephen C. Yeazell, The Misunder-
stood Consequences of Civil Process, 1994 Wis. L. REV. 631, 633 n.3 (1994).
9. In 1936, 19% of all civil filings went to trial; in 1938, 19.9% did. Thus, the trial rate appears
to have been fairly stable throughout that period. Id.
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tion of the plaintiff's injuries, but no other expert testimony would be
likely. As a consequence, the variables that could affect trial outcome
were relatively modest: how credible would the witnesses-particu-
larly the parties-be, and how serious were the injuries? Damages, if
they were awarded, would be limited to compensatories; the only sig-
nificant wild card would be the amount the jury might award for pain
and suffering.
III. THE MATERIALS OF TRANSFORMATION
Many of the central elements of this quite ordinary lawsuit have
transformed themselves between that not-too-distant past and now.
Because some of the more obvious aspects of the case-the negli-
gence suit, the contingent fee, and settlement as a predominant reso-
lution-look superficially similar, however, we can easily miss the
transformation. Legal academics may be particularly likely to miss
the point because many of the changes have occurred in places where
we are less likely to look: in social and economic developments
outside law and, within law, in the business and financial structure of
practice, rather than in its substantive or procedural rules. Moreover,
even when legal rules have changed, the interaction of the changes
with the business and financial structure, rather than the substantive
changes themselves, has produced the most dramatic results. To
make the camouflage almost complete, some of the most salient
changes have been quite obvious: there is no hidden key to be found
or deep conspiracy to be uncovered. Instead, we need to connect
some developments that individually will be quite well known, and to
reflect on how they have transformed the practice of civil litigation,
particularly the hemisphere focusing on torts. Broadly speaking, one
can summarize these changes by saying that a large expansion of con-
sumer credit and insurance created a vast pool of solvent potential
defendants. As this happened, procedural changes made it possible to
probe more deeply into the minds and file cabinets of these defend-
ants. Combining the products of this discovery with improved firm
capitalization, the plaintiffs' bar was able over several post-war de-
cades to persuade courts and legislatures to make a series of small
changes in the law, the effect of which was to improve substantially
the plaintiffs' chance of recovery.
A. Credit and Insurance
No one working on a contingent fee intentionally sues an insolvent
defendant. As a consequence, anything that changes the proportion
of solvent defendants has the potential for increasing the proportion
[Vol. 51:183
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of lawsuits to liability-producing events. Enormous changes in U.S.
society over the past seventy-five years have produced just such a set
of linked developments. Since the Great Depression, this country has
seen vastly increased credit-enabled purchasing of two major sources
of liability-producing activity: automobiles and housing. With credit
has come liability insurance, and with liability insurance has come
growth in "defendant populations."
In 1920, about 45% of U.S. households owned the dwelling in which
they lived.10 In 2000, the proportion had increased to 67%.11 This
change will give heart to those who cherish Jeffersonian democracy.
Combined with other changes, it will also give heart to tort lawyers,
whether representing plaintiffs or defendants. The rise in ownership
did not by itself increase the prevalence of insurance. In 2000, an
owned house was almost certainly an insured house, with the coverage
extending not only to fire, hail, and water, but also to liability.' 2 By
contrast, while in 1925 one might expect that prudent homeowners
would purchase fire insurance, two circumstances made such insur-
ance less important to the tort bar. First, not all fire coverages in-
cluded liability. 13 Second, it was a good deal less than certain that all
homeowners would carry any insurance; in 1951, a standard insurance
text noted that "at the present time it is regarded as improvident for
any property owner to allow his property to be uninsured."'14 But the
improvident will be always with us, and in the prewar period, any
given house had a non-trivial chance of being uninsured or, if insured,
of having no liability coverage. Two developments changed that.
First came the Federal Housing Administration and the Veterans
Administration home loan programs. 15 Born of economic depression
and war, they had their primary effect in opening lines of credit to
employed citizens who lacked either the down payment or the finan-
cial standing to convince a private mortgage lender to make a loan.
By guaranteeing repayment, the VA and the FHA enabled employed
buyers with trivial assets to purchase houses: "$99 down to VA buy-
ers," blared the billboards around new suburban postwar subdivisions.
One of many secondary effects rippled out to the tort system: as part
10. U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, FIFTEENTH CENSUS OF THE U.S.: FAMILIES 6 (1933).
11. U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, HOUSING VACANCY SURVEY: THIRD QUARTER 2000, avail-
able at http://www.census.gov/hhes/www/housing/hvs/q300tab5.html (last visited Oct. 19, 2001).
12. Standard home insurance policy.
13. WILLIAM. R. VANCE & BUIST M. ANDERSON, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF INSURANCE 23,
866-907 (3d ed. 1951).
14. Id. at 23.
15. KENNETH T. JACKSON, CRABGRASS FRONTIER: THE SUBURBANIZATION OF THE U.S. 203-
06 (1985).
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of the required loan conditions, these governmental insurers required
homeowners insurance, which by the early 1950s almost inevitably in-
cluded liability coverage.16 Consequently, as Levittowns and Daly
Cities went up all over the United States, each dwelling represented
not only housing but also a new ability to respond to a tort judgment.
Since World War II, the expansion and securitization of the mortgage
market has meant that two-thirds of U.S. households own their dwell-
ing and possess at least one form of liability insurance.17
What the federal government did for housing, what used to be
known as the Big Three did for automobile insurance. Automobile
ownership is ubiquitous; in 1999, 104 million household units in the
United States owned 216 million registered vehicles, yielding just over
two registered vehicles per household.' 8 Automobile financing, in-
cluding a recent variation-leasing-is only slightly less ubiquitous.
In 1947, only about a third of car purchasers financed their
purchases.19 By 1970, that proportion stood at about 50%,20 and it has
since then grown. With institutional financing comes mandatory in-
surance; your mother or your state government may not require you
to buy insurance, but a finance company will, and, unlike your mother
or your state government, the finance company will rigorously enforce
and monitor the insurance obligation. Because no finance company
will allow a purchaser to be uninsured and auto policies include both
liability and comprehensive insurance, almost seven-eighths (86%) of
the 216 million motor vehicles registered in the United States were
covered by liability insurance. 2' The remaining 14% still amounts to
thirty million vehicles, which are not evenly distributed among states
16. Mortgage lenders require fire and casualty insurance to protect their collateral. They do
not require liability insurance, but since about 1950, homeowners have overwhelmingly chosen
such policies as part of their insurance package. HOWARD W. LEGG, A BRIEF OUTLINE OF
INSURANCE 197-98, 203 (1968).
17. In 2000, 67.4% of American households owned their home. U.S. BUREAU OF THE CEN-
SUS, HOUSING VACANCIES AND HOME OWNERSHIP ANNUAL STATISTICS: 2000, available at http://
www.census.gov/hhes/www/housing/hvs/annual00/annOOtl3.htm (last visited Oct. 19, 2001).
18. USA Statistics in Brief-Law, Education, Communication, Transportation, Housing,
available at www.census.gov/statab/www/part2.html (last visited Oct. 19, 2001). I have not found
a report parallel to that on housing ownership that gives the actual proportion of vehicle
ownership.
19. U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, HISTORICAL STATISTICS OF THE U.S.: COLONIAL TIMES TO
1970, PT. 2 717 & SERIES 0 175-86 (1975).
20. More precisely, it was 53% for new cars, 48% for used. Id.
21. USA Statistics in Brief-Law, Education, Communications, Transportation, Housing,
available at http://www.census.gov./statab/www/part2.html (last visited Oct. 19, 2001).
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and cities, but even in the jurisdictions -with the highest rates of unin-
sured motorists, two-thirds are insured.22
Expanded credit spread home and automobile ownership widely
within the United States. Two-thirds of U.S. households own (with
their mortgage-holder) their dwelling and with it a liability insurance
policy. Those same households are likely to own a fraction more than
two automobiles, each covered by a liability policy. These changes in
insurance coverage were primarily the result not of mandatory insur-
ance laws but of the spread of credit markets. Institutional creditors
like their risks in small doses, and when they can easily shift those
risks to others, they will. This risk-reduction effort by financial insti-
tutions has increased the pool of insured actors, a development with
significant implications both for the plaintiffs' and defendants' bars.
As the spread of liability insurance was remaking the landscape of
potential defendants, the growth of another insurance market affected
the damages available in those lawsuits. In 1940, about 9% of the U.S.
population had health insurance.23 In 1993, encouraged by generous
federal tax treatment as well as growing national wealth, that propor-
tion was more than 70%, having dropped from a high of 80% in
1980.24 Health insurance has a more complicated relation to litigation
than does liability insurance. Liability insurance directly produces a
solvent prospective defendant and, given liability and injury, obvi-
ously increases prospective recovery. Health insurance might, theoret-
ically, reduce propensity to claim by absorbing some plaintiffs'
damages from liability-producing behavior. In fact, the story has been
more complicated. Until quite recently, the courts of most states and
those of the federal government applied to tort damages the collateral
source rule, making it possible to recover from a tortfeasor costs that
had been absorbed by an insurer. 25
More important, the availability of insurance, together with govern-
ment investment in research and the growth of medical technology,
has fueled a large rise in costs of medical care. In every decade since
22. Ins. Research Council, New IRC Study Estimates 14% of Drivers Uninsured, Aug. 12,
1999, available at http://www.ircweb.org/news/Press-uninsured.html (last visited Oct. 19, 2001).
23. Randall Bovberg et al., U.S. Health Coverage and Costs: Historical Development and
Choices for the 1990s, 21 J. L., MED. & ETHICS 141, 144 (1993).
24. Id. The 70% figure measures only the proportion of the population covered by private
health insurance, and thus excludes another fifty million persons.
25. See Note, Section 1983 and the Collateral Source Rule, 40 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 101, 103
(1992); John G. Fleming, The Collateral Source Rule and Loss Allocation in Tort Law, 54 CAL. L.
REV. 1478 (1966). Since 1980, legislative changes have altered the rule, but even in those juris-
dictions that have done so "allow plaintiff to retain any portion of the collateral benefit that he
has directly or indirectly paid for." Note, Section 1983 and the Collateral Source Rule, supra, at
107.
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1929, the growth in health care expenditures has exceeded the growth
in Gross National Product,2 6 and in the post-war period, the rate of
inflation in health care costs has substantially exceeded the Consumer
Price Index.27 Because medical expenses are a key element in most
injury cases-perhaps the key element-if medical costs increase at
more than the rate of inflation, lawsuits become comparatively more
attractive to plaintiffs' lawyers, who are working for a share of the
total damage bill. Put another way, insurance and health care re-
search have made tort suits more attractive investments for plaintiffs.
Making them more attractive for plaintiffs has made them a growth
industry for the insurance industry and for the defense bar. Litigation
has achieved a symbiotic relationship with the most significant aspects
of the consumer credit market.
B. Changes in Substantive Law
Changes in the incidence of individual insurance coverage produced
a greater number of insured owners of houses and cars, but most indi-
vidual insurance coverages are relatively modest. Before the tort bar
could recapitalize itself, additional mechanisms for risk spreading and
incentives for deeper investment both had to appear. They did, start-
ing in the late 1950s, as a result of several related developments.
First, products liability laws opened the doors wider. With the Cali-
fornia Supreme Court leading the way, manufacturers became liable
for a wide variety of injury-producing products.28 Such liability had
long-term consequences for the financing of the plaintiffs' bar. Prod-
ucts liability made deeper investments in specialized knowledge prof-
itable. Automobile accidents might have repetitive patterns, but any
given auto accident could injure a fairly limited number of persons.
Not so with defective products: one could now attack the design of the
bumper, gas tank, or steering wheel as the cause of injuries in hun-
dreds or in thousands of accidents, with the added advantage that a
Fortune 500 corporation, not an individual insurance policy, would be
the source of damages. 29 Moreover, products liability suits expanded
26. Bovberg et al., supra note 23, at 142.
27. Bovberg et al., supra note 23, at 151.
28. Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 62 (1963). Chief Justice Traynor first
proposed strict liability as the basis for recovery in products liability. Escola v. Coca Cola Bot-
tling Co., 24 Cal. 2d 453, 461 (1944) (Traynor, J., concurring).
29. A brief search online reveals literally thousands of recent products liability suits against
Fortune 500 companies. See, e.g., In re Silicone Gel Breast Implants Prods. Liab. Litig., 793 F.
Supp. 1098 (J.P.M.L. 1992) (conditionally approving a $4.23 billion class settlement for silicone
breast implant litigation against Dow Corning Corp.); Clay v. Ford Motor Co., 215 F.3d 663 (6th
Cir. 2000) (affirming a $17.5 million jury award after finding a design defect in victim's SUV).
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liability into realms that might in an earlier era have seemed to in-
volve self-inflicted injuries: power saws and tools, snow blowers, home
heaters and appliances. Mass production and distribution meant that
it became increasingly difficult to imagine an injury in which there was
not a potentially liable manufacturer. For the bars-plaintiffs' and de-
fendants'-products liability suits required more experts and some
knowledge of design and manufacturing processes;30 a lawyer contem-
plating a series of such cases might make substantial investments, eco-
nomic and intellectual, in developing expertise. Others have and will
continue to debate the economic and social wisdom of such develop-
ments;31 for my purposes, it is enough to note its existence.
As products liability developed, another previously closed door
opened: municipal and charitable immunity crumbled. Hospitals, mu-
nicipalities, and state and federal governments all began to be subject
to something that looked like tort liability. The Federal Tort Claims
Act 32 and equivalent state statutes made governments liable for ordi-
nary negligence; 33 their continued immunity existed only for decisions
that could be characterized as "discretionary" or intentional3 4 and
they continued to be immune to punitive damages. Because this low-
ered liability corresponded with an array of post-war governmental
initiatives ranging from the interstate highway system to expanded
public education, the tort regime combined with increased govern-
mental activity to produce a broad range of potential lawsuits. The
story of charitable institutions was similar: hospitals, orphanages, and
30. The Restatement (Third) of Torts places the burden of proof on the plaintiff to demon-
strate that a "reasonable alternative design would have reduced the foreseeable risks of harm."
PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 2 cmt. f (1997). Though the plaintiff does not need to produce a proto-
type alternative design to make his case, proving an alternate design will strongly support her
case and clearly require expert testimony. Id.
31. Many of the debaters, whether decrying or applauding the changes, tend to take a short
view of the problem, focusing either on the costs of the compensation system or on the impor-
tance of compensating injured persons, without embedding the system in the context of contem-
porary U.S. society. The United States is, among industrial societies, low both on the index of
regulation and of social welfare systems. The tort system thus performs in the U.S. regulatory
and compensatory functions that in other systems are performed by government. Those who
want to limit the tort regime thus have the responsibility of suggesting alternatives; those that
want to preserve it have the responsibility of demonstrating its superiority to alternatives.
Neither group characteristically accepts this responsibility.
32. 28 U.S.C. § 2671 et seq. (1988).
33. 28 U.S.C. § 2674 (1990).
34. For a history of sovereign immunity and its decline in the United States, see PETER H.
SCHUCK, SUING GOVERNMENT 35-41 (1983); COMMITTEE ON THE OFFICE OF ATFORNEY GEN-
ERAL, NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF AITORNEYS GENERAL, SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY: THE TORT
LIABILITY OF GOVERNMENT AND ITS OFFICIALS (1979).
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similar institutions were now subject to liability,35 and although their
pockets were shallower than those of the product manufacturers or
state and federal governments, they were substantial enough to war-
rant more than an occasional lawsuit. For the many charitable institu-
tions that ran hospitals, the combination of their new exposure to suits
with the increasing ability of the plaintiffs' bar to locate physicians
willing to testify against a fellow doctor expanded the number of suits
in which the plaintiff's lawyer could say, in effect, "I don't know
whether this terrible injury was the fault of the doctor or the hospital;
I leave that question in the jury's capable hands. '36
As these events unfolded, a final substantive doctrinal change con-
solidated their effect: the substitution of comparative fault for the re-
gime of contributory negligence. 37 In its purest form, of course,
contributory negligence was a complete defense: any negligence of the
plaintiff entirely barred recovery. Anecdotal evidence suggests that
juries sometimes declined to apply the comparative negligence rules in
their full rigor.38 Plaintiffs, however, never knew in advance whether
juries would thus temper the law, and the formal regime insisted that
even a small amount of contributory negligence entirely negated de-
fendant's liability. As a consequence, plaintiff's tort litigation was
often a losing, and always a risky game. As courts and legislatures
modified contributory negligence into various regimes of comparative
negligence, plaintiffs' chances of at least a modest return on a given
lawsuit increased. To be sure, comparative negligence could also re-
duce the plaintiff's recovery by allowing the jury explicitly to recog-
nize his fault. But this feature of comparative negligence only served
to emphasize the respects in which both sides to a tort case were en-
gaged in risk management-the plaintiff trying to avoid an investment
35. Charitable immunity came under widespread attack in the mid-1940s, inspired in part by
Judge Rutledge's extensive criticism. Georgetown v. College of Hughes, 130 F.2d 810 (D.C. Cir.
1942). For a summary of the fall of charitable immunity, see EDITH L. FISCH ET AL., CHARITIES
AND CHARITABLE FOUNDATION 471-80 (1974). For an argument against the possible rebirth of
charitable immunity, see Note, The Quality of Mercy: "Charitable Torts" and their Continuing
Immunity, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1382, 1382 (1987).
36. In one medical malpractice case, a surgical instrument broke off into the plaintiff's spinal
canal during surgery. The jury found the doctor, hospital, and manufacturer each not liable
because the plaintiff could not sufficiently prove liability for any one defendant. Anderson v.
Somberg, 67 N.J. 291, 297 (1975). The appellate court held that "the jury should have been
instructed that the failure of any defendant to prove his non-culpability would trigger liability
.... A cause of action against all ... defendants will be unacceptable and would work a miscar-
riage of justice sufficient to require a new trial .... Id. at 298.
37. California courts led the transition to a comparative fault regime. Li v. Yellow Cab Co.,
119 Cal. Rptr. 858, 861 (1975).
38. Stephen C. Yeazell, The New Jury and the Ancient Jury Conflict, 1990 U. CHI. LEGAL F.
87. 113-14 (1990).
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in excess of recovery, and the defendant seeking to prevent or mini-
mize any recovery.
The expansion of products liability, the fall of municipal and chari-
table immunities, and the advent of comparative negligence combined
to produce the phenomenon that my late colleague Gary Schwartz
called "the secondary defendant." 39 In a mass-production society,
many injury-producing events will appear to have several legally plau-
sible causes. The immediate moral agent of my injuries is the driver
who ran the red light, but the manufacturer of my car (which lacked
safety features that could have prevented or contained design features
that exacerbated my injuries), the manufacturer of the other car (with
a similar list of design defects), the municipality that designed the in-
tersection (failing to light or mark it optimally), the hospital to whose
emergency room I was taken (which failed to treat me promptly and
properly), and others have some role in bringing about my current
state of health. As any lawyer will note, many of these "secondary"
defendants have the substantial advantage of possessing deep pockets,
so that a liability judgment, even of partial responsibility, has a high
likelihood of being collectible. Their attractiveness as plausible de-
fendants is therefore great; I leave to a later section an analysis of the
importance of this added attractiveness.
So far, I have cataloged several developments in substantive law
that opened doors to expanded tort liability. Each opened door bene-
fited the plaintiffs' bar in obvious ways; each also benefited the de-
fendants' bar, for every action against a solvent or insured defendant
was defended. This rise in lawyers' employment was magnified by the
rise of the secondary defendant, which produced employment for not
one but several defense lawyers in many cases.
C. Changes in Process: Discovery & Settlement
My argument thus far would seem unlikely to come from the hand
of someone who makes a living writing and teaching about civil proce-
dure, for almost none of what I have thus far said relates to procedu-
ral rules.40 Let me redress that omission. Civil litigation in the second
half of the twentieth century has become less risky but more expen-
sive than it was in the first. More precisely speaking, as a result of
procedural changes, contemporary civil litigation requires a longer-
39. Interview with Gary Schwartz, William D. Warren Professor of Law, UCLA School of
Law, in Los Angeles (May 2001).
40. The exception would be the importance of the secondary defendant, chronicled in the
preceding section. Without a liberalized joinder regime, it would have been less feasible and less
attractive to sue the secondary defendants.
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run investment horizon but increases the expectable returns on such
long-run investments. The plaintiffs' bar became more diversified and
better capitalized in part because these changes enabled it to survive.
At the same time, changes in the procedural system meant that deeper
capitalization paid off for the bar as it might not have in an earlier era:
there was productive work for that capital to do.
Civil litigation in 1925 was what criminal litigation is today-essen-
tially a trial practice. Many cases settled, but a substantial proportion
went to trial, and, more important, the pretrial phase of litigation
rarely called for substantial investment. A lawyer had to do some in-
vestigating of the episode underlying the litigation. A defendant
might prepare a demurrer to a badly drafted complaint and the drafter
of that complaint might have to redraft it, but there was not much call
for substantial investment between the complaint and the weeks
before trial.
That all changed in the decades following 1938. The Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure and the state law changes that imitated them
moved the focus of civil litigation from the back to the front of the
lawsuit-from trial to discovery and a pretrial practice. They permit-
ted, and in time came to be seen to require, the pretrial documenta-
tion of the factual record on which the claim and defense rested.
Moreover, until 2000, the Rules explicitly permitted a pretrial investi-
gation broader than evidence admissible at trial, and discovery inevi-
tably included much that was marginally relevant, inadmissible, or
merely peripheral to the main lines of argument at trial.41 By permit-
ting the lawyers to make this broad exploration, the Rules and their
state analogues increased the expense of preparing and defending a
civil trial: a lawyer who saved her preparation until the weeks before
trial was likely to find the case dismissed on a summary judgment mo-
tion.42 By increasing the expense, the Rules also placed the thinly
capitalized plaintiffs' bar initially at a disadvantage. Although today
the defense bar routinely excoriates the fishing expeditions permitted
by broad discovery, 43 discovery initially put plaintiffs at a practical dis-
41. The 2000 amendments restrict parties to discovery of material "that is relevant to the
claim or defense." FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1) (2000).
42. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986); Estate of Henderson v. W.R. Grace Co., 541
N.E.2d 805 (I11. App. Ct. 1989); Robinson v. Warner-Lambert & Old Corner Drug, 998 S.W.2d
407 (Tex. App. 1999) (making explicit the lawyer's responsibility to employ discovery before
trial-at least enough to produce evidence that would withstand a defense motion for summary
judgment).
43. The 2000 amendments to the Federal Rules, which slightly narrowed the material discov-
erable without judicial authorization, were widely seen as favoring defendants. See, e.g., John S.
Beckerman, Confronting Civil Discovery's Fatal Flaws, 84 MINN. L. REV. 505, 540 (2000) (calling
the amendment "radical, pro-defendant").
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advantage because many plaintiffs' lawyers did not have the capital to
sustain a prolonged lawsuit, and whatever else discovery did, it pro-
longed lawsuits. It took several decades for the plaintiffs' bar to catch
up by recapitalizing themselves to the point where they could take
cases deep enough into discovery to realize some of the potential gain
from such pretrial preparation. One can see the modern plaintiffs'
bar, better capitalized and diversified, as a response to the demands of
a procedural regime requiring greater investment. Without better fi-
nancial resources, the plaintiffs' bar simply could not have survived,
much less prospered.
But the discovery rules not only required more investment by the
plaintiffs' bar. Pretrial discovery enabled that investment to pay off.
Consider the expanded bases of liability discussed in the preceding
section. Products liability and municipal and charitable liability have
one characteristic in common: they open up for legal scrutiny large
and complex institutions. Because such institutions are bureaucracies,
they provide fertile ground for discovery to plow. Bureaucracies run
on written documents and employ substantial amounts of technology
to produce, copy, and archive those documents. The photocopy ma-
chine and digital technology have greatly expanded the likelihood that
any given document will exist in multiple copies. Those documents
can be uncovered if one has enough knowledge of the institution, per-
sistence, and cash to back the persistence. Such an environment cre-
ates a symbiotic relationship between discovery and substantive law.
Had there not been a regime of pretrial discovery, it would not have
been worth developing a law of products liability. Without pretrial
access to engineering studies, internal memoranda, and the like, deci-
sions about appropriate safety levels in relation to known technology
and cost would have been difficult to make. On the other hand, once
there was an embryonic products liability regime, modern discovery
gave it a good deal to chew on. The situation for municipal and chari-
table liability is similar: to decide whether the state designed the road-
way sensibly, one needs internal reports; having those internal reports,
it is possible to make sensible decisions about the appropriate frame-
work of liability. To assert symbiosis is not to argue that the organism
has evolved in an optimal way: the law of liability in all of these areas
may be sub-optimal. My point is rather that it is difficult to imagine
developing such a body of law without pretrial access to substantial
amounts of internal information.
What happens with all this information, of course, is that the parties
begin to talk about settlement. Sometimes they do this because in the
face of good information good lawyers make converging assessments
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about the value of their cases. Sometimes-they do this because judges
push them into various forms of settlement discussions. Sometimes
they do this because the prospect of trying the case seems so terrify-
ingly risky-for both sides-that even a bad settlement is preferable
to a trial. Whatever the reason, settlement is a very common means of
concluding civil litigation-so common that one thoughtful writer has
referred to a trial of a civil lawsuit as pathological. 44
When settlements occur, they are, as compared with our reference
point in 1925, as likely to look like a corporate merger than a cash sale
at a supermarket. Just the set of names should convince most of us of
this proposition: Mary Carter agreements, Sliding Scale agreements,
High-Low agreements, structured settlements, and cede-back agree-
ments. Each of these is a staple not of bet-the-industry class actions
but of run-of-the-mill tort litigation.45 Several of these new settlement
forms feed on a development already discussed-expanded liability of
secondary defendants.
The sliding scale agreement provides a good example. 46 Such
agreements are, by definition, of use only in multi-defendant cases.
The plaintiff settles with one defendant. That defendant will pay more
if some of the cost is contingent. Such an arrangement benefits the
plaintiff if the settling defendant will pay some of the settlement
amount immediately, giving the plaintiff bridge financing for the rest
of the lawsuit. For example, in one prominent case, the settling defen-
dant guaranteed that the plaintiff would recover at least $3,000,000. If
the remaining defendants escaped liability entirely, the settling defen-
dant would pay all of that amount; if plaintiff recovered less than $3
million from the remaining defendants, the settling defendant would
44. Samuel R. Gross & Kent D. Syverud, Don't Try: Civil Jury Verdicts in a System Geared to
Settlement, 44 UCLA L. REV. 1, 3 (1996) (stating "Trial is a disease, not generally fatal, but
serious enough to be avoided at any reasonable cost.").
45. To be completely accurate, this statement should exclude the cede-back provision, which
was born of the Exxon Valdez oil spill and its attendant litigation. The cede-back agreement was
a deal between Exxon and some, but not all, of a class of punitive damage plaintiffs, in which the
plaintiffs agreed with Exxon to collect, then return to Exxon any portion of a punitive damage
award they might be entitled to. In re Exxon Valdez, 229 F.3d 790, 792 (9th Cir. 2000). The
Valdez litigation was not a bet-the-company case, given Exxon's size, but it cannot fairly be
characterized as run-of-the-mill either. Id.
46. A sliding scale recovery agreement is a covenant between one or more plaintiffs and
some, but not all, of the defendants that limits the agreeing defendant's liability to an amount
dependant upon the amount of the recovery from the non-agreeing defendants. CAL. CIV.
PROC. CODE § 877.5 (1980). Sliding scale settlements are also known as "Mary Carter" agree-
ments. See Booth v. Mary Carter Paint Co., 202 So. 2d 8 (Fla. Ct. App. 1967). These settlements
have been criticized as unfair against public policy. See, e.g., John E. Benedict, It's a Mistake to
Tolerate the Mary Carter Agreement, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 338 (1987) (claiming that "Mary
Carter" agreements prejudice non-settling defendants and are legally unethical).
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make up the difference, and if the plaintiff recovered more than that
amount against the non-settling defendant, the settlor would be re-
lieved of liability.47 Such a settlement allows the plaintiff and one of
the defendants to settle on terms whose ultimate cost to the settling
defendant will depend on the outcome of litigation with the remaining
defendants. Such agreements come in several sub-types. 48 All the
types serve two related purposes. First, and most obviously, they re-
duce the risk to the plaintiff of continued litigation by guaranteeing
some minimum recovery. Second, they often serve to provide bridge
financing for the part of the lawsuit that remains unsettled. By set-
tling with one defendant, the plaintiff gains funds that can be used to
pay rent, medical bills, and the like-and by his lawyer to finance con-
tinued or increased discovery. One can see this feature quite explic-
itly in the form some such agreements take-that of contingent loans.
In this type of agreement, the settling defendant makes all or part of
the settlement a loan, whose repayment is made contingent on the
outcome of the rest of the lawsuit. This form of agreement thus ex-
tends to the settling defendant the contingent arrangement character-
istic of the original agreement between the plaintiff and her lawyer. It
thus spreads and reduces the risk of continuing the lawsuit.
One sees the same sophisticated risk spreading in the high-low set-
tlement. Unlike many settlements, a high-low agreement assumes the
case will be tried.49 Rather than ending the suit, it puts a cap and a
ceiling on the amounts at risk. Plaintiff agrees that no matter what the
eventual judgment, he will not collect more than the amount specified
in the agreement. In return, defendant agrees that even if there is a
verdict for the defense, the plaintiff is entitled to a minimum amount.
Often used in cases where liability is uncertain but damages high, the
high-low agreement enables both parties to manage the risks of litiga-
tion: it amounts to insurance against a catastrophic verdict, with the
premium being the surrender of total victory.
D. Defense Constraints: Litigation Budgets and Insurance Controls
Many of the changes chronicled thus far either rewarded or re-
quired increased investment by plaintiffs' law firms. As these changes
occurred, defendants' firms, at least those compensated by insurance
companies, found themselves under increased economic pressure
47. Abbot Ford, Inc. v. Superior Court, 741 P.2d 124 (Cal. 1987).
48. In some, the settlor pays a minimum amount no matter what the subsequent recovery; in
others, the "sliding" part of the scale goes all the way to zero. In some, the settlor has veto
power over subsequent settlements by the remaining parties, and so on.
49. John L. Shanahan, The High-Low Agreement, FOR THE DEFENSE, July 1991, at 25.
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from the insurers who retained them. It is easy to understand the in-
surance carriers' concerns. Contemporary litigation has few "natural"
expense limits: the proliferation of experts and the variety of pretrial
discovery techniques, generally operating with slight judicial supervi-
sion, would enable any given lawyer to conduct an elaborate and ex-
pensive defense for many common claims were he operating on his
own without budget constraints. Such a total-war defense has the ad-
ded attraction of increasing the lawyers' fees, since locating, consult-
ing with, deposing, and preparing an expert for trial takes time and
thus creates fees. The insurers' response has been firm. They have
established elaborate agreements with their counsel, all imposing cost
and permission constraints on lawyers' time and fees. Not only must
retained counsel agree to fee schedules (sometimes on a per-case
rather than an hourly basis), but carriers have generally required that
their retained counsel must seek permission before taking litigation
steps likely to increase expenses substantially (engaging an expert,
scheduling a deposition, and even legal research beyond a threshold
number of hours). A few insurance defense bars have argued that
these constraints are so severe as to impair their ability adequately to
represent their nominal clients, the insured. 50 Those contentions may
be exaggerated, but they reflect a sea-change in the balance of litiga-
tive power. Today, in some cases, it will be the defense that is under-
capitalized and outgunned. Such imbalances will not occur in high-
profile bet-the-company defenses, where the client will be supple-
menting or substituting for the insurers' legal fees. For example, this
defense constraint did not occur in the asbestos or tobacco litigation,
and it is unlikely to occur in major products liability litigation directed
against well-heeled manufacturers. Rather, it will crop up sporadi-
cally, in more ordinary tort litigation, where all or most of the defense
is conducted by an insurance carrier. In such cases, a well-capitalized
and specialized plaintiffs' lawyer may have deeper resources than does
the defense. I am not suggesting charitable foundations start financ-
ing products liability defense; nor am I arguing that this scenario is
pervasive, but conversations with experienced plaintiffs' and insur-
ance counsel suggest that neither is it fanciful, as it would have been
seventy-five years ago.
IV. THE RE-CAPITALIZED PLAINTIFFS' BAR
The mere possibility of a plaintiffs' bar with resources superior to
counsel retained by an insurer reflects a series of changes that have
50. In re The Rules of Prof. Conduct, 2 P.3d 806, 810 (Mont. 2000).
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occurred in the plaintiffs' bar over the past three-quarters of a cen-
tury. Many of them have been enabled, others necessitated by
changes in law; still others have resulted from more subtle shifts in
social climate. Some are well documented (though their significance
sometimes overlooked); for others, I shall rely on more impressionis-
tic evidence.
A. Aggregation, Marketing, Specialization, and Diversification
The average size of group in which U.S. lawyers practice has in-
creased over the past seven decades. In spite of the turn-of-the-cen-
tury growth in big firms, until late in the twentieth century, the
average U.S. lawyer was a solo practitioner. 51 Today, the solo lawyer
is still the modal form of practice, but the mean and median lawyer
operates in a small firm.52 That shift from solo to "firmness," even
for the small firm, creates three opportunities. First, the individual
lawyer-and sometimes the firm-can be more specialized, with
higher levels of expertise in a particular subject area. One thus finds
plaintiffs' lawyers who specialize in air crash litigation, asbestos, to-
bacco, tire blowouts, and the like-something almost unthinkable in
the first quarter of the twentieth century. The website of the Ameri-
can Trial Lawyers Association lists seventy-three fields, ranging from
the relatively broad (business litigation) to the specialized (food and
drug, aviation), to the esoteric (Phen-fen and Redux). That specializa-
tion allows firms to amass intellectual capital-in pilot training and air
traffic control, in damage assessment, in banks of experts, and the like.
This expertise has two results. First, such lawyers and firms can mar-
ket themselves, primarily to other lawyers, as experts in particular
forms of litigation. Such marketing can produce enough referrals to
justify maintaining this specialized intellectual capital. Second, the in-
vestment in intellectual capital can then produce the returns to scale
that derive from having a set of cases with similar subject matter, as
well as greater returns from any particular case. Finally, the larger
firm (recalling that in this context "larger" means a dozen, not hun-
dreds of lawyers) may rationally make a larger investment in firm-
specific capital. The solo lawyer cared about her own reputation-
probably-but knew for certain that her own professional life expec-
51. In 1971, 52% of U.S. lawyers were solo practitioners. By 1980, 49% were solo practition-
ers, and in 1995 (the most recent data available), 47% of all lawyers were solo practitioners.
Note that 1991-1995 saw the first increase in solo practitioners (at least since 1960) from 45% to
47% (approximately 35,000 lawyers). CLARA N. CARSON, THE LAWYER STAFISTICAL REPORT 7
(1999).
52. In 1995, 69% of all firm practitioners worked in a firm of two to fifty lawyers. Id. at 8.
20011
DEPAUL LAW REVIEW
tancy limited the time in which any return on that capital could be
expected. A firm of a dozen or twenty-lawyers has a longer horizon
and can therefore make larger investments in its own capital-train-
ing, libraries, web sites-and in its reputation.
Larger firm size also permits the lawyers involved to hedge their
bets by combining complex, high-risk, high-payout cases with simpler,
lower-risk, lower-payout cases that pay the rent while waiting for the
larger ships to come in. Herbert Kritzer's valuable studies of the
plaintiffs' bar in Wisconsin demonstrate how, within even moderately
sized firms, a staple of workers' compensation or similar work can di-
versify a portfolio of larger, slow-maturing, high-risk, high-damage
tort cases. 53 Such cases also serve a marketing tool: the client whose
minor work-related injury pays the firm's electric bill may return if
there is a family catastrophe that warrants a much larger, but much
less certain lawsuit.
One can see all these forces at work in the two editions of Jerome
Carlin's Lawyers on Their Own.5 4 Both books portray a group of
marginal lawyers operating on the outskirts of the profession under
fiercely competitive conditions. But the terms of competition have
changed. In the first edition, published in '1962, Carlin's lawyers were
scrambling for a variety of cases, including personal injury litigation.
As Carlin described his lawyers, they were not a particularly skilled
lot, but they often succeeded in waiting out the insurance company.
Thirty years later, Carlin's solo practitioners complained that they had
been chased out of the personal injury field by the specialized tort
lawyers, almost all operating in small firms.55  The plaintiffs' bar,
more deeply capitalized, specialized, and expert, has managed to cap-
ture a part of practice previously left to solo generalists. Put differ-
ently, lawyers who fifty years ago would have operated on their
own have combined, allowing deeper intellectual and financial
capitalization.
B. Changes in the Regulatory Environment and
Inter-firm Transactions
For this development to occur, the plaintiffs' bar had to be able to
market itself, both to prospective clients and to other lawyers, in ways
that were unlawful in 1925. Without marketing, individual tort plain-
53. Herbert M. Kritzer & J. Mitchell Pickerill, Contingent Fee Lawyers as Gatekeepers in the
American Civil Justice System 22, at 19-20 (Inst. for Legal Studies, Univ. of Wis., Working Paper
No. DPRP 12-3, 1997).
54. CARLIN, supra note 4. at xix.
55. CARLIN, supra note 4, at 87-90.
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tiffs, unlikely to be repeat litigants, would not have the knowledge
that would allow them to choose a specialist lawyer. Without a more
sophisticated referral system, lawyers would neither know about nor
have incentives to refer to other lawyers with deeper capitalization
and more expertise. Both arrangements are critical and both reflect
changes in the regulatory regime over the century just past.
The more visible changes have to do with lawyers' direct marketing.
Certain forms of solicitation and advertising unlawful in 1925 are now
common. Watchers of advertisements on daytime television in most
large urban markets know how pervasive such direct marketing is.
This and similar forms of marketing-billboards and bus ads, letters of
solicitation, and the like-have achieved constitutional protection in a
series of cases that started in the civil rights movement and have ex-
tended to directly commercial forms of solicitation. 56 As a result, re-
sidents of most large cities could with no effort come up with the
phone numbers of several lawyers in the course of a commute to
work, simply by reading billboards and transportation advertisements.
Direct marketing alone, however, would likely not support special-
ized plaintiffs' practices. Prospective clients are too widely dispersed
and insufficiently sophisticated consumers to do the sort of shopping
that would enable them to distinguish clearly among the layers of the
bar. The ads may bring a client to some lawyer's office, but it is un-
likely to be the right lawyer's office. To get the client to the right
lawyer requires fairly sophisticated inter-lawyer marketing and ex-
change of claims. Via referrals and various forms of permitted fee-
sharing, a lawyer with a potential case can get it to a specialized, well-
capitalized firm who can first make an intelligent evaluation of it and
then, if warranted by the facts, afford to take it deep enough into dis-
covery to achieve a good settlement. Such forms of referral are now
well developed, the prospective recoveries are high enough, and the
specialization required is obvious enough that many unspecialized and
undercapitalized lawyers will refer such a case. The motives are less
likely to be concerns about malpractice (one imagines that few such
actions are filed) than the prospect of a really large recovery, even a
small portion of which will amply reward the referring lawyer for what
amounts to good brokerage. A glance at the 1,200-page directory of
the American Trial Lawyers Association, with on-line access, fields of
specialization, and cross-indexing of members, gives one a glimpse
into the expertise and the sub-specialization achieved by what was
56. See Shapero v. Kentucky Bar Ass'n., 486 U.S. 466, 475-76 (1988).
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once a marginal, and marginally competent, group of lawyers.5 7 The
plaintiffs' bar, with its system of-referrals, is achieving transactionally
the kinds of specialization and breadth that the corporate bar is
achieving by growth in firm size.
To make such an assertion is to pose a riddle. The history of the
U.S. law firm in this century has been the growth of firm size. The
large firm has all the advantages of specialization and diversifica-
tion-on a larger scale. A reader of this essay who is familiar with this
chapter in professional history might well concede all that has been
said but ask why the plaintiffs' firms have not grown to much larger
sizes-into aggregations rivaling some of the defense firm, most of
whom have scores or hundreds of lawyers. Why are the typical plain-
tiffs' firms a dozen lawyers rather than a hundred? Why do plaintiffs'
firms form temporary, case-specific aggregations rather than taking
the path of the corporate and defense bar? Posing complete answers
to these questions lies beyond the boundaries of this essay, but several
suggestions are possible. Marc Galanter has posited a personality
type for the plaintiffs' lawyer-a lone-ranger with a knight-errant set
of characteristics-that does not mesh well with large organizations.58
That observation meshes with anecdote and personal observation, but
may not go far enough. As one of my colleagues put it, "Even lone
rangers learn to work together if the costs of not doing so are high
enough. '59 Moreover, it is possible that the plaintiffs' firms are
merely lagging the rest of the bar and that the next decades will do for
the plaintiffs' bar what the past fifty years have done for the corporate
firms.60
Alternatively, an explanation not resting on personality characteris-
tics is possible. The markets served by the plaintiffs' bar are unsophis-
ticated, local, and not likely to be recurrent. Most clients with
personal injury suits cannot make good comparative evaluations of
lawyers, and as one-shot purchasers of legal services have little moti-
vation to develop expertise. In consequence, they are unlikely to go
far beyond their communities in seeking a lawyer: personal knowledge
57. Association of Trial Lawyers of America, ATLA Desk Reference 2000-01 (2000), availa-
ble at http://www.atla.org. (last visited Oct. 19, 2001).
58. Marc Galanter, Anyone Can Fall Down A Manhole: The Contingency Fee and its Discon-
tents, 47 DEPAUL L. REV. 457, 470-71 (1998); Marc Galanter & Thomas Palay, A Little Jousting
About the Big Law Firm Tournament, 84 VA. L. Rev. 1683, 1686-87 (1998).
59. Interview with Stuart Banner, Visiting Professor of Law, in Los Angeles (Aug. 2001).
60. At least one plaintiffs' firm now tops two hundred lawyers and has diversified into defense
work as well. According to its web site, "Robins, Kaplan, Miller, & Ciresi, L.L.P., is a national
law firm of over two-hundred lawyers and three-hundred support staff located in Atlanta, Bos-
ton, Chicago, Los Angeles, Minneapolis/St. Paul, Naples, Orange County, and Washington,
D.C." See http://www.rkmc.com/firm.about.cfm (last visited Jan. 9, 2002).
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may be much more important than breadth or expertise. The plain-
tiffs' bar has used inter-firm referral and fee splitting to achieve a net-
work of expertise that replicates many of the advantages of larger
firms. A local lawyer whose client has a case that requires expertise
greater or different than that of the original lawyer, can refer his client
to a firm with enough expertise and capital to develop the case well.
The original lawyer has the incentive to make that referral in most
cases because the fee will depend on the amount of recovery. The
original lawyer has the knowledge to make an intelligent referral in
many cases because of changes in the regulation of the legal profes-
sion and the development of a remarkable network within the plain-
tiffs' bar-both described in the next section. Unlike the defense bar,
then, the plaintiffs' bar is marketing as much to other lawyers as it is
to clients, and the client-driven appeal of one-stop legal shopping is
less important for plaintiffs than for defendants. To use a medical
analogy, the plaintiffs' bar-once comprised of the ultimate general
practitioners-is now made up of specialists who market to general
practitioners rather than directly to clients.
C. Lines of Credit and Specialized Financing
Historically, one of many reasons for the marginal success of solo
practitioners was that they lacked the intellectual and financial capital
to pursue a case to a settlement that maximized the client's recovery.
Instead, critics charged, the plaintiff's lawyer settled for a very small,
but very early recovery, thus minimizing the number of hours. Spe-
cialization creates some of the intellectual capital needed, but that
alone would probably not suffice to create the vigorous, effective rep-
resentation that characterizes the best of the plaintiffs' bar today. For
that, one needs financing as well as knowledge. That financing has
now presented itself in a remarkable number of forms. The simplest is
a line of bank credit. Most major commercial banks now routinely
extend lines of credit to firms that can present a plausible business
plan. 61 Such financing brings with it the requirements of planning
and financial discipline; as one banker described it:
One thing we do is to look at a firm's collateral base-its receiv-
ables, its inventory, how much it makes .... With a plaintiffs' firm,
there is no asset base. What they offer is an income stream of sev-
eral types of cases that will come in over time. So you research their
reputation in the marketplace, the size of the organization, the num-
ber of cases coming in .... If a lawyer tells you, 'I'm going to invest
$1 million in this case and it's the only one I have, and I'm sure I'll
61. Michael Jonathan Grinfeld, Justice on Loan, 19 CAL. LAW. 39, 39 (1999).
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get paid on June 30,' we know that's not how it always works. We
are more inclined to lend money to someone who says, 'I have
seven cases and a business plan that includes a worst-case scenario
of what may happen to them.' 62
But such standard financing only begins the discussion. Some banks
have opened more specialized divisions, which serve the legal services
industry more specifically. 63 The financial arrangements include lines
of credit but can also involve factoring and other more creative forms
of finance. Beyond the realm of commercial banking lie other, more
imaginative forms of investment and finance. Take as one example
Perry Walton, who has established what might be called a venture cap-
ital firm, Resolution Settlement Corporation. According to press ac-
counts, the firm makes contingent loans directly to plaintiffs and
occasionally to their lawyers, based on the firm's assessment of the
strength of the case.64 It engages in no direct representation of clients
and thus avoids the regulatory regimes that might affect lawyers. In-
stead, it is a bank for lawsuits. The sums advanced, whose repayment
is contingent on the success of the suit, provide immediate cash to the
plaintiff-thus avoiding the temptation of too early and too low a set-
tlement. Alternatively, the contingent loans may directly finance the
lawyer so that he can pursue a case deeper into discovery, engaging
experts and conducting wide document discovery. Apparently, the
firm makes an assessment of each case proffered and decides, based
on that assessment, whether and how much to lend. The report indi-
cates that the lender wishes at all costs to avoid plaintiffs who are
litigating "on principle," rather than on the basis of maximizing cash
recovery.
Compared with Perry Walton, several other ventures are positively
staid. They lend not on the basis of complaints but on judgments en-
tered on jury verdicts.65 Again, their theory is that many suits can
reach a greater recovery given deeper capitalization. In this case, the
event that needs bridge financing is the defendants' appeal, an event
that one can expect in most high-recovery cases.66 If one needs fur-
ther proof that sophisticated finance has come to ordinary litigation,
consider the fact that one of the players in this emerging world of
62. Id. at 40.
63. Interview with Jean L. Tardy-Vallernaud, Bank Julius Baer, in Los Angeles (Oct., 2000)
(formerly associated with First Interstate Bank and Security Pacific Bank).
64. Richard B. Schmidt, Staking Claims, WALL ST. J., Sept. 15, 2000, at Al.
65. Margaret Cronin Fisk, Large Verdicts for Sale, NAT'L L.J., Jan. 11, 1999, at Al.
66. Litigation expenses are front-loaded, so in many cases the additional legal expenses of an
appeal will be slight. But the plaintiff often wants immediate recovery. To enable the plaintiff's
lawyer to hang on through the appeal, bridge financing not of legal costs but of plaintiff's ordi-
nary expenses, medical and similar costs, is necessary. Id.
[Vol. 51:183
RE-FINANCING CIVIL LITIGATION
litigation finance is General Electric Capital Corporation, a major,
well-capitalized player in the contemporary financial world.67 One
can imagine wonderful forms of financial hedging in which GE fi-
nance takes a piece of a judgment on appeal-a judgment against a
GE manufacturing arm. In such a world, everyone wins, no matter
what the outcome. Even without supposing such an interconnected
universe, it is clear that we have come far from the constrained, margi-
nal world of the 1925 lawsuit with which we began. The next section
steps back to summarize and assess the changes.
V. THE RESULTING TRANSFORMATION
We can measure the distance in several ways. Perhaps the most di-
rect is to revisit the Los Angeles traffic accident with which we be-
gan-an intersection collision.
A. The Case Transformed: 2000
To begin with, the plaintiff will have an easier time finding a lawyer
than in 1925. Indeed, if she is still conscious after the accident, as she
awaits the ambulance, she can find the names and telephone numbers
of several lawyers just by observing the ads on the sides of buses pass-
ing the intersection. Even if the lawyers doing such saturation mar-
keting are low on skill, they have easy access to networks of more
skilled and better capitalized lawyers with whom they can make fee
arrangements, thus putting the plaintiff in the hands of a lawyer who
can afford to take her case as deep into litigation as the amount at
stake warrants. That itself is an enormous change.
Compared with the reference point seventy-five years earlier, the
amounts at stake are more likely to be determined by the extent of
injuries and by the merits of various claims than simply by the size of
the other driver's insurance policy. In many such cases one can posit
several secondary defendants-the manufacturers of both vehicles,
the City of Los Angeles (as designer of the intersection and employer
of the ambulance drivers), the manufacturers and designers of street
and traffic lights, and the UCLA Hospital (supposing this to be the
nearest emergency room). Under California law, each of these possi-
ble tortfeasors may be jointly and severally liable for the economic
damages to the plaintiff.68 Thus, even a very modest degree of com-
67. In one recent tort action, General Electric Capital Corporation paid $5.8 million for a $10
million contingency share of the final judgment. Id.
68. Non-economic damages-e.g. pain and suffering-are proportional to the defendant's de-
gree of fault. See, e.g., CAL. CIv. CODE § 1431.2 (West 1997 Supp. 2001) (stating "Each defen-
dant shall be liable only for the amount of non-economic damages allocated to that defendant in
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parative fault may yield a significant recovery. Moreover, spurred by
the knowledge of these liability rules, one or more of these secondary
defendants may seek to settle early in the lawsuit, thus supplying
bridge financing for a suit against the remaining defendants. To be
sure, such settlements by less than all defendants must be approved by
the court after a "good faith" hearing, but the set of standards is suffi-
ciently elastic that either a small sum paid by an insolvent defendant, a
small sum paid by a solvent but marginally liable defendant, or a large
sum paid by any defendant is likely to be approved. 69
Compared to its earlier analogue, one can also be reasonably sure
that the case will not go to trial. Kent Syverud's work with California
jury trials tells us that only the pathological case will go to trial. Bar-
ring some grudge match between insurance carriers or among the mu-
nicipal and governmental defendants, one can be fairly certain that
something like economic rationality will prevail. For the defendants,
the primary job will be avoiding the very small chance of a catastroph-
ically large verdict. In a world in which 2% of trials result in 50% of
damages,70 the job is not to prevent any recovery by the plaintiff but
to keep it within manageable bounds. For the plaintiff, the job is the
converse: to minimize the chance of no recovery and, beyond that, to
maximize the chance of a very large verdict. The plaintiff can do so in
several ways-by pyramiding a set of successively larger settlements;
by taking several such settlements and then going to trial with one of
the remaining ones (a trial perhaps financed by a sliding scale agree-
ment); by bluffing the preceding strategy and then going to trial with a
high-low agreement, and so on.
Given this larger bag of plaintiff's tools, it is particularly important
not to jump to conclusions about assured victory for the plaintiff. Not
all plaintiffs win, and most settlements and verdicts are low. Syverud
reminds us that most tort trials in California end with defense victo-
ries.71 In another jurisdiction, Bert Kritzer reminds us that plaintiffs'
lawyers have achieved parity-but just parity-with their defense
direct proportion to that defendant's percentage of fault ...."); N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 1601 (McKin-
ney 1997) (basing liability on the "relative culpability of each person causing or contributing to
the total liability for non-economic loss ...."). In addition, damages for medical practice are
subject to absolute pain and suffering caps. See, e.g., CAL. CiV. CODE § 3333.2 (West 1997)
(establishing a $250,000 pain and suffering cap in medical malpractice actions); Wis. STAr.
§ 893.55(4)(d) (West 1997) (limiting non-economic damages to $350,000).
69. Abbot Ford, Inc. v. Superior Court, 43 Cal. 3d 858, 886-87 (1987).
70. 35% of all damages in the California trials sampled were awarded in just 1% of the cases.
Samuel R. Gross & Kent D. Syverud, Getting to No: A Study of Settlement Negotiations and the
Selection of Cases for Trial, 90 MICH. L. REV. 319, 384 (1991).
71. Defendants were successful (defined as judgments of less than $10,000) in 93.5% of the
cases sampled. Id. at 337.
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counterparts. 72 They work hard for their livings, which, putting a
small number of outliers to one side, are comparable to those of their
adversaries but not wildly superior. But, even with Syverud's and
Kritzer's important cautions in mind, it is equally important to mark
the distance between 1925 and 2000. The plaintiffs' bar is profession-
ally and economically on a par with their defense counterparts in the
litigation that forms the great bulk of the caseload. As a consequence,
the playing field is much closer to level than it was in our great-grand-
mothers' days.
B. The Drab and the Golden: The Development of Several
Torts Bars
How then did we get here? I think it is possible to trace two some-
what different paths, though here I would defer both to John Coffee
and Bert Kritzer, each of whom knows more about one of those paths.
Writing about the early phase of English Renaissance literature, C.S.
Lewis once purported to be able to see two schools, which he rather
tendentiously called "the drab" and "the golden. ' 73 I think one can
see two analogous segments of the modern U.S. torts bar-one, the
golden, that has attracted much press, much controversy, and some
legislative opposition; another, the drab or ordinary, that has pro-
ceeded largely beneath the radar screens but may be more significant.
Writing a history of English literature, Lewis not surprisingly focused
on the golden. In the history of civil litigation, I think the drab de-
serves more emphasis.
Reading contemporary accounts of civil litigation, particularly tort
litigation, one easily imagines that most plaintiffs recover, that recov-
eries are of storied sums, and that the primary problem of tort lawyers
is managing their investments wisely. Bert Kritzer, Kent Syverud, and
Sam Gross,74 among others, have demonstrated otherwise. But we
must also remember that there is a top tier of the torts bar, where
these folk legends approximate reality more closely than with ordi-
nary litigation. We can understand the tiers better by starting in the
borderlands.
72. Herbert M. Kritzer, The Wages of Risk: The Returns of Contingency Fee Legal Practice, 47
DEPAUL L. REv. 267, 280 (1998).
73. C.S. LEWIS, ENGLISH LITERATURE IN THE SIXTEENTH CENTURY, EXCLUDING DRAMA 64
(1954).
74. "The plaintiff is unlikely to cash in on the remote chance of a grand prize, and no market
exists in which she can sell her claim to someone who is in a better position to extract its full
value." Gross & Syverud, supra note 70, at 384.
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Products liability started the second stage of growth. Such suits
have two salient features. They require deeper capitalization than do
most common personal injury suits: more experts, more discovery,
and the higher likelihood of trial. But they repay this investment be-
cause in a world of mass production, a product that has injured one is
likely to have injured several. So long as the lawyer has initial capital-
ization and can communicate his knowledge (and his success) to fel-
low lawyers, he can reap the returns from the initially higher
investment. One is therefore not surprised to learn, for example, that
more than one lawyer has created a specialty in suits resulting from
injuries sustained by the explosion of a particular brand of tires at-
tached to a particular brand of automobile.75 These product liability
suits were one of the critical steps in creating a specialized, well-capi-
talized plaintiffs' bar.
Conceptually, air crash litigation is a concentrated form of products
liability litigation. From the plaintiffs' lawyers' point of view, such
suits have the added attraction of high damages (until recently, air-
planes have been occupied primarily by people with above-average
earning capacities) and a concentrated group of plaintiffs. There may
be some unseemly scrambles to sign up clients, but once that unpleas-
ant aspect is past, a well-financed plaintiffs' firm can competently
maximize recoveries for the heirs of those killed in the crash. Again,
such suits emphasize the distance between the solo-dominated, under-
capitalized, often inexpert tort bar of 1925 and that of the turn of the
twenty-first century. Air crash litigation takes the lawyers deep into
conflicts of law, international treaties and conventions, actuarial testi-
mony involving life expectancies and earning capacities, frequently
into a search for secondary governmental or similar defendants, 76 and
often into intricately structured and staged settlement arrangements.
These are not your grandmother's tort lawyers, operating out of
storefronts without libraries and with dirty windows while hoping they
could wait out the insurance company. 77
75. One firm's website devoted specifically to Firestone and Bridgestone tire litigation states
that the firm is currently accepting cases in New York, New Jersey, and Pennsylvania; if your
claim does not arise in one of these states, "[they] also have the resources to refer your matter to
colleagues in your area . http://www.njlabor.com/defectivetires.html (last visited Oct. 20,
2001).
76. See, e.g., United States v. Finley, 490 U.S. 545, 556 (1989) (where such a search precipi-
tated a Supreme Court argument over the reach of pendent federal jurisdiction).
77. According to its web site, the law office of one successful plaintiffs' lawyer has won an
American Bar Association award for law office design. See http://www.cliffordlaw.com/ (last
visited Oct. 20, 2001).
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Asbestos litigation combines the substantive aspects of products lia-
bility with many of the damage aspects of air crash litigation. The
story of the slow discovery, first of the health effects of asbestos and
then of its manufacturers' knowledge and concealment of those
hazards has been told.78 More interesting for the purposes of my story
is the role of the plaintiffs' bar in bringing first a series-many tens of
thousands-of individual cases and, with more fanfare and contro-
versy, assembling an ultimately unsuccessful settlement class. Both
the individual and the class actions bespeak a mature, sophisticated,
well-capitalized bar. The individual actions are in this respect even
more impressive than the class suits. The individual actions reflect the
ability of a segment of the bar first to specialize in an area that re-
quired assembly of some expertise and of the capital to take the early
cases deep enough into discovery to reveal the basis for liability, and
then to assemble a large set of clients with similar claims, so as to
realize returns on the sunk intellectual capital. From this standpoint,
the reference in the Supreme Court opinion to a group of clients
whom both the plaintiffs' and defendants' lawyers referred as the "in-
ventory" plaintiffs was impressive. 79 The plaintiffs' lawyers were op-
erating on an essentially industrial scale, managing a stream of clients
who represented future income flow. The defendants, understanding
the implications of this income stream, sought in the class action to
enter into what might in a different context be called an exclusive out-
put contract with an indefinite duration.80 This characterization casts
no light on the propriety of proposed settlement, but does underline
the financial sophistication of the bar involved.
With the asbestos cases, we have crossed the boundary from the
drab to the golden, a term that describes not so much the returns to
the lawyers involved as the high profile of the cases. The asbestos
cases have occasioned years of hand wringing8 l by the judiciary who
feared the collapse of the litigation system, by the bar, and by
academia who either applauded the creativity or decried the collapse
of professional ethics implicit in the proposed settlement class.8 2 For
our present purposes, it is beside the point to resolve any of these
questions substantively. Instead, their importance lies in their reflec-
78. See generally IRVING J. SELIKOFF & DOUGLAS H.K. LEE, ASBESTOS & DISEASE (1978);
U.S. DEP'T. OF HEALTH & HUMAN RES., TOXICOLOGICAL PROFILE FOR ASBESTOS (UPDATE)
(1995).
79. Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 601 (1997).
80. See U.C.C. § 2-306 (1998).
81. Georgine v. Amchem Prods., Inc., 878 F. Supp. 716 (E.D. Pa. 1994).
82. See Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Ethics and the Settlements of Mass Torts: When the Rules
Meet the Road, 80 CORNELL L. REV. 1159 (1995).
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tion of a revolution in the plaintiffs' bar, which at the end of the twen-
tieth century had the intellectual and financial capital to inflict
bankruptcy or a near-equivalent on a major industry.
The tobacco litigation wars that provide the theme of this confer-
ence are, like the asbestos cases, "golden" tort litigation. Here the
reference ought to include both the reward to the lawyers, as well as
the high profile of the cases-not unrelated phenomena. Others in
this symposium will anatomize the remarkable features of this litiga-
tion, including the remarkable alliance between state governments
and plaintiffs' lawyers. For my purposes, the tobacco litigation again
reflects the deepened financial and intellectual capital of this elite tier
of the plaintiffs' bar. After many years of unsuccessful litigation
against the tobacco defendants, a combination of persistence and luck
resulted in some plaintiffs' victories. That much was fairly standard to
an observer of the products liability bar. What followed was not, and
it bespoke the flexibility, imagination, and entrepreneurial spirit of
this segment of the plaintiffs' bar. The lawyers were able to form risk-
sharing arrangements among themselves to finance what was obvi-
ously going to be very expensive bet-the-company litigation-litiga-
tion that was going to be well and expensively defended. That pooling
of resources and sharing of risk was so successful that many states
were prepared to invest in the litigation vicariously, shifting the risk of
losing to the private bar in return for fees whose size is now being
challenged. 83 We read that the successful plaintiffs' bar has now
"securitized" its stream of fee income by floating a bond issue, ena-
bling them to re-deploy the capital from the tobacco fees. 4 This is
financing sophistication on a scale that would have caused the heads
of Carlin's solo lawyers to swim.
The final, "golden" segment of the plaintiffs' bar is, of course, the
securities bar, which has the nearly unique distinction of having
spawned a series of federal statutes designed, unsuccessfully, to put it
out of business. 85 This bar, dominated by a handful of firms, is an
outlier both in terms of intellectual and financial capital. But it repre-
sents a high concentration of elements present in much larger and
83. In re Private Counsel Agreement, 1999 WL 1022131, at *1-*2 (E.D. Tex. Nov. 5, 1999);
State v. Am. Tobacco Co., 772 So. 2d 417, 418-19 (Ala. 2000); State ex ret. Nixon, 34 S.W.3d 122,
125-26 (Mo. 2000).
84. James Wooton, Litigation Bonds Are a Risky Investment, WALL ST. J., Mar. 14, 2001, at
A22.
85. One can think of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-67,
109 Stat. 737 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.), and specifically the section
referring to class actions, 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4 (1995), as designed essentially to hamper the opera-
tion of several small but nationally prominent plaintiffs' firms.
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more widely dispersed firms: specialization (combined with a dash of
bet-hedging diversification), 86 sufficiently deep capital to withstand
the expectable procedural motions and the duration of discovery, in-
cluding the ability to finance credible experts, and the financial and
transactional sophistication to create elaborate settlements, under-
stand the strategic significance of tiered insurance coverage, and the
experience credibly to threaten to take cases to trial.
Most of the public debate, high outrage, and proposed legislation
have focused on these "golden" elites of the bar with allegedly ob-
scene fees and devastating effect on American enterprise.87 These
topics are worth debating in another forum. I want instead to concen-
trate on the ways in which these high-profile groups share, in a con-
centrated form, characteristics of much of the U.S. tort bar. Further,
this more broadly dispersed tort bar is likely of greater and more du-
rable significance than their higher-profile brothers and sisters. In
three-quarters of a century, the previously marginal plaintiffs' bar has
reorganized itself. Several features produced the reorganization-
broad demographic shifts in the incidence of asset ownership and in-
surance, as well as changes in substantive law and in procedure. The
changes in organization, in turn, effected several of these framing fea-
tures: a better-capitalized bar, in turn, exploited the opportunities in-
herent in a broad discovery regime, producing liability in several areas
requiring deeper expert knowledge and the discovery of internal
documents.
Through this well-capitalized tort bar, the United States has priva-
tized some of the regulatory regime that some other developed na-
tions have socialized. There is a legitimate inquiry about the
comparative costs of the two regimes. But that inquiry, not the ques-
tion of whether legal fees or litigation itself are "excessive," is the real
question. Such an inquiry lies far beyond the boundaries of this essay,
whose ambitions are descriptive rather than normative.
86. Lief, Cabraser, Heimann & Bernstein, LLP, for example, does mass tort as well as securi-
ties litigation. Interview with Elizabeth Cabraser, attorney & partner, in Los Angeles (Apr.,
1998).
87. See, e.g., Bob Keefe, Talk of Tort Reform Heats Up, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, Feb. 23, 1997,
at 5D (reporting that many businesses have avoided locating themselves in Florida because of its
litigious reputation); Henry Weinstein, Attack Waged on Fees Anti-Tobacco Attorneys Received,
L.A. TIMES, Mar. 15, 2001, at C1 (discussing the U.S. Chamber of Commerce's possible attack
on the tobacco settlement legal fees); Robert A. Levy, Spoils of the Tobacco Shakedown, TEX.
LAW., Feb. 15, 1999, at 23 (urging contingency-fee contracts between the state and private attor-
neys to be made illegal).
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C. What the Drab and Golden Share: Litigation as Investment
Stepping back from the sub-anatomization of the segments of this
mature bar, one notes several features that they share both with their
peers on the plaintiffs' side and with their characteristic adversaries on
the defense side. These characteristics make these two bars into sym-
metrical forms of investment and risk management-in effect into a
part of the larger financial services industry. For both sides, litigation
is an investment portfolio in which the task is to manage and spread
risks, maximizing gains, and insuring and reinsuring against losses.
1. Specialization, Diversification, and Insurance
That point is relatively obvious when applied to the defense bar.
Many such lawyers are retained by an industry whose purpose is insur-
ance, an institutionalized form of risk-reduction through risk-spread-
ing. It is slightly less obvious as applied to the plaintiffs' bar, but an
examination of their activities suggests that it is just as true here.
Consider first the assembly of a litigation portfolio. Until the last few
decades, it was unlawful for a lawyer representing individuals to do
the sort of direct marketing that made it likely that he could attract a
sufficient number of similar cases to warrant the investment of signifi-
cant intellectual capital in a specialized area. Removal of bans on ad-
vertising have made it easier, and the formation of good inter-lawyer
referral networks, now speeded by Internet technology, have made
such specialization easier. An account in the legal press nicely cap-
tures the consequences. The article refers to a lawyer in Arizona who
has specialized in cases involving Firestone tires, whose alleged failure
caused various vehicle mishaps;88 the article captures a moment
shortly after a rash of such accidents had led to an investigation by the
National Transportation Safety Board, which released a report:
Longtime accident victims' lawyers such as Tom Dasse of Scotts-
dale, Arizona, previously armed with the best data are hustling to
keep up with the fresh statistics the companies are releasing-in be-
tween potential clients calling, other lawyers calling to offer cases if
you give them a cut, and then the lawyers calling again to take back
their cases.89
The point about Dasse is that he is not a fabled member of the torts
bar, but a much more ordinary contemporary practitioner. He has
established an expertise ("previously armed with the best data") in
tire safety and made that expertise known to a group of colleagues
88. Bob Van Voris & Matt Fleischer, Feeding Frenzy Over Firestone, NAT'L. L.J., Sep. 11,
2000, at Al, A9.
89. Id.
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sufficiently broad to create a steady stream of referrals from lawyers
who understand that Dasse's intellectual capital is sufficiently deep
that they will profit from drawing on it ("other lawyers calling to offer
cases"). Dasse, in turn, is prepared to enter into agreements ("if you
give them a cut") with these referring lawyers. At the moment de-
picted in the news article, the value of Dasse's specialized intellectual
capital was sinking quickly in the wake of disclosures by governmental
agencies, which by making available data previously known only to a
small group of specialists was, in effect, putting Dasse's trade secrets
into the public domain. Dasse's special expertise in tire manufacture
and tire defect litigation was rapidly becoming less special, and ac-
cordingly less valuable, as government sources made public the fruits
of their investigation. As this process occurred, the lawyers who had
previously referred cases to Dasse because of his expertise were con-
cluding that they could handle the litigation themselves and conse-
quently "calling again to take back their cases." 90 The less specialized
lawyers suddenly find that, with the information released by the gov-
ernment, they can handle the cases without Dasse's specialized knowl-
edge. This news account, then, depicts a well-functioning market in
tort claims, organized among generalists and specialists, with active
brokerage of those claims finding the place where they can most effi-
ciently be handled: the referring lawyer's initial judgment was that
Dasse could maximize the recovery. That market is sufficiently sensi-
tive and flexible that it quickly responds to changes in informational
capital: they now believe that with the publicly released information,
Dasse's comparative advantage has disappeared. Even with relatively
ordinary claims, that market is functioning actively.
Diversification lies on the other side of this portfolio-management
coin. The referring lawyers off-loading a case onto Dasse might be
seeking two goals. One was Dasse's presumably better ability to
judge the value of the claim and to maximize that value. Another was
to diversify their own claims portfolio. For a lawyer not already ex-
pert in tire litigation, such a case, if competently managed, would re-
quire a large investment and would, therefore, occupy a large share of
the lawyer's productive capacity-her time. By referring the case to
Dasse, a lawyer could rebalance her portfolio, reducing the risk posed
by a disproportionately large investment in a single claim. Bert
Kritzer has shown us how contemporary tort practitioners diversify in
another way: they often operate in firms that consciously seek to bal-
90. Id.
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ance lines of work, mixing some cases with a low but relatively certain
return with others that have a much higher but far less certain payoff.
This strategy of diversification faithfully reflects litigation realities.
Kent Syverud's work with California jury verdicts has nicely demon-
strated the rationality of such a strategy. In the last two decades of
the twentieth century, most jury-tried tort cases in California ended in
a defense victory, and even when the plaintiff won, the mean damage
award was small: half of the total damages awarded in the state were
awarded in two percent of the cases. 91 Under these circumstances,
rational plantiffs' lawyers would be seeking a balanced portfolio, in
which a stream of small but reliable low-payout cases would be
blended with a smaller number of potentially high-recovery cases.
Kritzer's work tells us that, for once, the real world rather closely mir-
rors one that an economist might model.
The argument that the plaintiffs' lawyers and the insuring entities
who pay the defense costs are both engaged in portfolio management
and risk hedging misses one significant difference between the two
groups. Because of the contingent fee, plaintiffs' lawyers are more
like the insurance companies than they are like the insurance defense
counsel. Defense counsel, whether paid by insurers or retained di-
rectly by self-insuring entities, generally lack a direct stake in the liti-
gation. 92 Defense counsel are more like salaried portfolio managers
than like investors.
2. Risk Hedging and the Fancy Settlement
This picture of civil litigation as portfolio management extends as
well to the actual conduct of individual pieces of litigation. From the
plaintiffs' side, many of the developments of the past decade enable
such hedging. The growth of the multi-defendant lawsuit (when
linked with joint and several liability) is one such development: with
several targets, one somewhat reduces the risk of the complete de-
fense victory, thus hedging the downside. Many of the newer forms of
settlement have the same features: they enable the plaintiff (and often
the settling defendant as well) to insure against catastrophic loss. The
high-low agreement does this by simultaneously placing a floor and a
ceiling on recovery. The sliding scale settlement does so by assuring
the plaintiff some recovery while giving the settling defendant a share
91. Gross & Syverud found that 3% of the cases yielded 50% of the damages in 1985-6 and
that just 1% of the cases produced 50% of the damages in 1991. Supra notes 70-71 and accom-
panying text.
92. I am ignoring here the negligible percentage of defense work done on a contingency basis.
When this arrangement is in place, there is direct symmetry between the lawyers.
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of any future recovery from non-settling defendants: in effect, it gives
the settling defendant preferred stock in the plaintiff's future litigation
successes. The emerging forms of finance litigation have a similar
goal: borrowing against a judgment, lending against anticipated litiga-
tion, and the like all disperse the risks of litigation and enable rational
portfolio management by the lawyers conducting it on behalf of their
clients.
VI. IMPLICATIONS
Understanding these changes also gives us a different perspective
on a long-running debate about the U.S. legal system. Recent decades
have seen an increased per capita rate of civil litigation. Is this in-
crease a result of increased demand from clients, or does it result from
an increased supply of lawyers and claims? The perspective suggested
here enables us to give a firm answer to this question: both. If my
argument coheres, related developments coalesced, enabling lawyers
better to serve existing demand and to offer a range of services un-
thought of in 1925. They also, and with notable success, sought to
stimulate demand and to increase the supply.
Perhaps the best analogy is with communications technology. The
telephone was in wide use in 1925 but came only in black and without
features we now take for granted. The rate of telephone usage has
increased many fold on a per capita basis since then, in part because
of rising standards of living, but in part because of the development of
technology that has taken communications to an entirely different
level: cell phones, the Internet, and wireless communications re-
present improved products that have, in turn, stimulated a much
greater demand for communications services-demand the suppliers
have stimulated both with advertising and with price incentives.
Something similar has occurred with lawyers. On the plaintiffs' side,
the change is most marked. On one hand, the plaintiffs' bar, better
capitalized, can offer superior service on ordinary "black telephone"
claims-a better bar can pursue negligently caused vehicular and simi-
lar injury claims more successfully than it could in 1925. But even
these "ordinary" claims have a different dimension. Because many of
them have plausible additional defendants or other value-enhancing
features, they are in a sense an improved product, one that has ex-
panded demand. And, to intensify the demand for these products,
lawyers are advertising, referring, and otherwise marketing under a
less stringent regime of professional regulation than that which pre-
vailed seventy-five years ago. As a result of this product improve-
ment and increased marketing, the plaintiffs' bar is able to offer its
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clients a more valuable product at a lower cost than it could in my
grandparents' era: they are offering digital cellular service for less
than a party line cost our grandparents. These product changes have
served existing demand-for the "black phone" claims that have ex-
isted for several centuries. They have also, by creating new services,
created demand that did not exist.
On the defense bar side, the demand has increased as a result of the
product improvement on the plaintiffs' side: lawsuits generate de-
fenses. But the supply has increased faster than the demand, with the
result that clients have been able to drive the price down as well with
various pricing regimes and cost controls. The consequence of the dif-
ferent forces operating on the supply and demand side of the plain-
tiffs' and defense bars has been an increasingly competitive market,
resulting both in lower costs and in improved products-better legal
services available at lower unit prices.
VII. CONCLUSION: Two WORLDS OF LITIGATION
Multi-billion dollar tobacco settlements, asbestos manufacturers
driven into bankruptcy by tort judgments, the subcontracting to tort
teams of state suits against gun manufacturers, and a plaintiffs' securi-
ties bar sufficiently powerful to draw federal legislation designed to
thwart its work: these are the stuff of urban legend and editorials in
the Wall Street Journal. And they surely warrant serious discussion.
But if we focus our gaze too narrowly on these remarkable events, we
miss the quieter deeper story of civil litigation. Both the plaintiffs'
and defense bars have reorganized themselves, the former more pro-
foundly than the latter. Compared to the world before the Great De-
pression, the defense bar operates under tighter financial constraints,
while the plaintiffs' bar is better capitalized, both in intellectual and
financial terms. A consequence is that the conduct of civil litigation-
even ordinary civil litigation in which the survival of whole industries
is not at stake-is conducted with more intensity and with greater fac-
tual, legal, and financial sophistication than in the past. It is in that
world of ordinary tort litigation that the greatest transformation has
occurred. That transformation, in turn, made possible the celebrated
asbestos and tobacco litigation.
Moreover, because the causes of the transformation lie deeply
rooted in contemporary social life and legal institutions, it is unlikely
that passing outrage and occasional spasms of legislation will change
the deeper structure. The credit economy and insurance have pene-
trated deeply into the practice of law. The modal civil case today in-
volves two lawyers, both managing a portfolio of lawsuits and seeking
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to maximize gain while minimizing risks in an environment of substan-
tial, but still incomplete, information, and who will end the case with-
out adjudication of the merits. The changes that have produced this
transformation are mostly, but not entirely, financial. But their do-
main is much wider than the headline-producing tort verdicts: those
are results, not the causes of the changes. The causes lie much deeper:
in the credit revolution that has produced widespread home and auto
ownership, as well as specialized lending sources of interest to lawyers
and clients; in structural changes in the practice of law that have in-
creased average firm size; in changed substantive law; in changes in
procedure that have loaded the most important events into the front
end of litigation; in fee-shifting statutes; in increasingly sophisticated
settlement arrangements; and in cost controls that place substantial
constraints on insurance-paid defense lawyers in routine cases.
Combined, these changes have transformed civil litigation over the
past seventy-five years: it makes available to prospective plaintiffs a
more sophisticated, better-capitalized bar, one that can invest more
deeply in individual cases. These changes have, in many respects, lev-
eled the playing field on which the plaintiffs' and defendants' bars
play their respective roles while making more legal services available
at lower costs both to plaintiffs and defendants.
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